Does a higher rate of reported transfusion reactions mean a hospital is safer?

Johanna (Jo) Wiersum-Osselton

TRIP Hemovigilance and biovigilance office

Outline

- Hemovigilance reporting in The Netherlands
- Study: does a higher rate of reported transfusion reactions mean that a hospital is safer?
- Achieving safety improvement:
  - SHOT
  - France
  - Within-hospital learning?
- What are the ingredients for avoiding errors? How can we bring about improvement?

After ten years…

- Still counting, no apparent improvement: no reduction in numbers of reports
- Is there a parameter which could indicate safety of blood transfusion?

Variation in rate of reports per 1000 units

Reports (y-axis): 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70

Units transfused (x-axis): 0, 10000, 20000, 30000, 40000

Legend:
- ◆ Serious
- ● TR (excl allo-antibodies and mild NHFR)

Figure 2.2–2.5

2010 participation

Total reports
per 1000 blood
components issued

Figure 2.2 Low usage organisations

Figure 2.3 Medium usage organisations

Figure 2.4 High usage organisations

Figure 2.5 Very High usage organisations

Consistency from year to year

Consistency from year to year:
Linear regression of rate in 2010 with 2009, 2006-8 and blood use level: $R^2 = 0.55$ (p<0.001)

TR = transfusion reactions: definite, probable or possible, excluding new allo-antibodies and mild febrile reactions

Analysis of 2006-2010 data

TR reporting rate (reports per 1000 units)

Hospital annual blood use (total units)

TR = transfusion reactions: definite, probable or possible, excluding new allo-antibodies and mild febrile reactions

Are hospitals with more TR reports safer?

**Incorrect blood component transfused
a possible proxy for unsafe transfusion**

adjusted odds ratios
Vox Sanguinis 2012

OR 2.5 (0.8-7.3)　　OR 4.2 (1.3-13.7)

No IBCT

1 or more

% of hospitals

Rate of transfusion reaction reporting

<1.8　　1.8 to 3.7　　>3.7

14　　9　　6

16　　28　　28

Conclusion: the data do not support that hospitals with a higher rate of transfusion reaction reports are safer

Hospital factors associated with higher likelihood of IBCT report

- Presence of transfusion safety officer

  1-4 years adjusted OR 2.8, 95% CI 0.6-13 vs no TSO

  All years adjusted OR 2.2, 95% CI 0.2-6.1 vs no TSO

- Hospital also reported near miss or other incident

  Near miss adjusted OR 14.2, 95% CI 3.0-66

  Other incident OR 15.0, 95% CI 4.2-56

- Hospital also reported alloantibody formation or mild non-hemolytic febrile reactions (<2°C)

Conclusion:

Consistent with better surveillance and more complete reporting; *it cannot be excluded* that hospitals with higher rates of transfusion reactions may have more incorrect transfusions to report.

Consistency of reporting rate

n=97 hospitals

Reports per 1000 units transfused (y-axis)

■ TR rate 2012

Reporting level in 2006 (x-axis: non-participant, 1, 2, 3)

Bar values: 3, 41, 31, 22

Level 1 <1.8 TR/1000 u
Level 2 1.8-3.7 TR/1000 u
Level 3 >3.7 TR/1000 u

TR = transfusion reactions: definite, probable or possible, excluding new allo-antibodies and mild febrile reactions

Data from SHOT

ABO incompatibility (France)

Reduction of ABO incompatible RBC transfusions

France	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
RBC	20	14	13	7	12	9	9	10	9	6	8	3	4
Plasma	5	4	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
Platelets	3	2	7	5	4	5	3	4	4	5	6	4	8

'Contrôle ultime' of ABO compatibility at bedside (since 1985); ministerial circular in 2003 stressed importance of identification of patient/unit

Incident reports to TRIP

Incidents	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Hospitals with reports (ever)
Incorrect blood component transfused	59	61	58	47	54	80
ABO-risk*	26	31	16	18	19	
ABO incompatible RBC transfusion	6	12	3	4	5	
Near miss	55	72	68	45	46	51
Other incident#	83	110	117	138	137	70

*TRIP assessment: risk to which the patient was exposed
#includes unnecessary transfusions and (SHOT term) "right blood right patient"

Hemovigilance:
is it making a difference to safety in the transfusion chain?

Johanna C. Wiersum-Osselton

Yes and no

Transfusion safety

Primary prevention

- Only transfuse if necessary
- Blood component
- Bloed transfusion laboratory: component selection
- Adhere to protocols, don't allow yourself to be distracted
- Patient safety culture

Secondary prevention

- Premedication (?)
- Component selection
- Speed of transfusion etc.

Tertiary prevention

- Monitor patient
- Respond appropriately

Training   Professionals   Management

Transfuson-related acute lung injury (TRALI): male-only plasma

Prior to change
P.A.R. 0.33 (95% CI 0.09 – 0.51)

TRANSFUSION 2011;51:1278-1283.

International consensus definition:
"possible TRALI" = ALI within 6h of Tf,
in presence of other risk factors:

Direct Lung Injury – aspiration, pneumonia, toxic
inhalation, lung contusion, near drowning
Indirect Lung Injury – severe sepsis, shock, multiple
trauma, burn injury, acute pancreatitis, cardio-
pulmonary bypass, drug overdose

No. of TRALI (y-axis: 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35)

Categories: Before, After

Legend:
■ FFP (and other bc)
■ no FFP

After excluding cases of "possible TRALI"
P.A.R. 0.37 (0.06 – 0.58)

Fig. 1. Annual incidence of TTBIs per 100,000 pools of 5 units of WBDPs. The number of cases and time of implementation of preventive measures are shown on the graph.

Use of hemovigilance data to evaluate the effectiveness of diversion and bacterial detection (Québec)

Robillard P et al, Transfusion 2011; 51:1405-11

In NL:
bacterial screening, diversion pouch and improved skin preparation introduced in 2001

After introduction of diversion the number of positive screening cultures [of platelet concentrates] decreased significantly from 0.85% to 0.37%.
De Korte D et al, Transfusion Med and Hemotherapy 2011; 38:251-254

Bacterially contaminated PC 2005-10

swissmedic

Year	Severity	Imputability	Pathogen	Transfused on day
2005	4	certain	E.coli	4
	4	certain	E.coli	5
	3	certain	P. fluorescens	3
	3	certain	P. fluorescens	4
	1	probable	Coagulase neg Staph *	2
2006	1	certain	Strep. salivarius	5
2007	1	probable	Strep. mitis	4
	1	certain	Coagulase neg Staph	4
2008	1	probable	Coagulase neg Staph	4
	3	probable	Coagulase neg Staph	1
2009	4	certain	Klebsiella pneumoniae	5
	3	certain	Klebsiella pneumoniae	5
	3	certain	E.coli	3
2010	3	certain	Bacillus cereus	5

* +Abiotrophia adjacens, Haemophilus parainfluenz.

IHS 2011, Amsterdam

M. Ruesch, IHS Amsterdam 2011

Overall risk (14/19)	1:11'000 / 1:8000 (incl. possibles)
Fatal reaction (3)	1:50'000

->Implementation of pathogen reduction

Switzerland: transfusion reactions associated with platelets

Transfusion reactions	2009-2011 cPCs		2011 & 2012 PI-PCs		PCs TRIP 2011
Units transfused	66,000		62,500		61665 distributed
	Reports	Rate per 1000	Reports	Rate per 1000	Rate per 1000
All definite / probable reports	223	3.4	160	2.5	2.2
Definite/ probable grade 3 reports	23	0.3	6	0.1	0.1
Septic transfusion reactions (n)	N=4		N=0		N=1

PC=platelet concentrate
cPC=conventional platelet concentrate
PI-PC=Intercept Pathogen-Inactivated platelet concentrates

Optimal blood use
Major role of blood transfusion committee and transfusion safety officer

Quality indicators for blood transfusion practice

Indicator 5 Indication setting for RBC transfusion: percentage of transfusions with pre-transfusion Hb level ≤ 6 mmol/l (≤ 9.6 g/dl)

Please also visit Poster no 2-22

Revised national transfusion guideline, 2011

78% of hospitals voluntarily provided data:

transfusion committee 96%
TSO appointed 85%

	Indicator 2b TSO time allocation					
	≥ 8 hours/week		< 8 hours/week		Total	
Indicator 1b	2011	2012	2011	2012	2011	2012
Annual ≥ 4	14%	23%	17%	13%	31%	35%
number of < 4	36%	32%	33%	32%	69%	65%
TC meetings Total	50%	55%	50%	45%	100%	100%

14% (2011) and 23% (2012) of responders complied both with the recommended minimum of four annual transfusion committee meetings and 8 hours' weekly employment of a transfusion safety officer.

Recommendation 2004: Kell negative or Kell compatible
2011: Rhesus c negative or compatible

New alloantibody formation in women aged <45 years

Where next

- Limitations of HV data
  - Lack of info about uncomplicated transfusions!
  - Problems of underreporting, incomplete information
- Keep up good data collection (improve efficiency if possible)
- Results accessible for policymakers and professionals
- Apply lessons learned:
  - Implement measure
  - Evaluate
  - Tweak

Plan

Do

Check

Act

Vigilance

In

Progress

IHN initiative

- representatives of HV systems with data
  - Data comparisons
  - Shared research projects
  - Evaluating measures
- Donor and recipient HV
- Kick-off meeting Friday 7th March
- If you are interested in participating or in receiving information: j.wiersum@tripnet.nl or ptomasulo@bloodsystems.org

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